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The Role of Transnational Civil Society in Shaping
International Values, Policies, and Law
Mariana Olaizola Rosenblat*

Abstract
This Essay suggests that predictions about the character of international law in the context
of rising authoritarianism may be nuanced by paying closer attention to the influence of
transnational civil society (TCS) on global affairs and normative development. While
acknowledging that pro-liberal civil society has faced escalating threats from authoritarian
governments in recent years, the Essay highlights the resilience, adaptability, and creativity of
TCS, which finds ways to remain active and harness sources of strength despite those threats.
However, TCS is not always pro-liberal, and there is evidence of strong anti-liberal civil society
influence as well. Whether or not authoritarian international law takes hold therefore depends
not only on the will of authoritarian heads of state to survive in power, but also on the ability of
pro-liberal TCS to campaign fiercely and proactively for the defense of democracy and human
rights.
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“Power is actualized only where word and deed have not parted company, where words are
not empty and deeds not brutal, where words are not used to veil intentions but to disclose realities,
and deeds are not used to violate and destroy but to establish relations and create new
realities.”―Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition1

I. INTRODUCTION
In Democracies and International Law, Tom Ginsburg makes predictions about
the character of international law in a world where authoritarian regimes continue
to gain ascendancy, not only in number but also in sheer power.2 From an
analytical and empirical perspective, he makes a convicting argument that
international law is likely to accentuate features that protect and advance
authoritarian leaders’ principal objective: survival in power.3 One of these
features—which, as he notes, is already deeply embedded in international legal
doctrine and discourse—is deference to state sovereignty.4 Ginsburg references
the oft-noted internal tension in international law between the twin fundamental
values of noninterference with state sovereignty and the protection of universal
human rights.5 He argues that the rise of authoritarian power around the world
will lead to state sovereignty gaining the upper hand over pro-democratic and
liberal norms, thereby bringing about a definite transformation in international
relations and law as we know them.6
In this piece, I will discuss one way in which Ginsburg’s analysis of and
predictions about international law could be nuanced, namely by attending to the
role of nonstate actors in shaping international policy priorities and law. In
particular, I will focus on transnational civil society (TCS) actors, whose influence
in the international and domestic arenas has been well documented.7 I define TCS,
1
2

3
4
5
6

7

HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 200 (1958).
See generally THE GLOBAL RISE OF AUTHORITARIANISM IN THE 21ST CENTURY: CRISIS OF
NEOLIBERAL GLOBALIZATION AND THE NATIONALIST RESPONSE (Berch Berberoglu ed., 2020).
TOM GINSBURG, DEMOCRACIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 192 (2021) (“authoritarian use of
international law will support normative development that specifically enhances authoritarianism.”).
See id. at 4–5.
See id. at 101–02.
See id. at 268–69 (predicting the advent of “sovereignty-reinforcing international law”), 285
(“Instead of the cosmopolitan vision promoted by liberals, we will instead see the return of a
rhetoric of sovereignty.”).
On the international role and influence of nonstate actors, see generally, e.g., NON-STATE ACTORS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Math Noortmann, August Reinisch & Cedric Ryngaert eds., 2015); NONSTATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Philip Alston ed., 2005); NON-STATE ACTORS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Bas Arts, Math Noortmann & Bob Reinalda eds., 2001); NON-STATE
ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Andrea Bianchi ed., 2009); PARTICIPANTS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON NON-STATE ACTORS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jean d’Aspremont ed., 2011); NON-STATE ACTORS AS NEW SUBJECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL LAW – FROM THE TRADITIONAL STATE ORDER TOWARDS
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in line with Ann Florini and other scholars in the field, as encompassing all
“self-organized advocacy groups that undertake voluntary collective action across
state borders in pursuit of what they deem the wider public interest.” 8 This
category includes an overlapping collection of individuals active in cross-border
social movements, advocacy coalitions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
religious groups, and academia.9

II. WHOSE VOICE MATTERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE?
According to the orthodox or classical tradition, international law regulates
relations among sovereign territorial entities called states.10 Some contemporary
scholars continue to subscribe to this state-centric view of international law,
insisting that the rules that govern the international system are primarily (or even
exclusively) created by and for states.11 In Democracies and International Law,
Ginsburg seems to adopt this largely state-centric conception, asserting that the
“international order is . . . produced by powerful states interacting with each
other, in turn creating opportunities and constraints for other states.” 12 Indeed,
his hypothesis and ultimate conclusions about the effect of democracy on
international law centers on the incentives heads of state have to cooperate (or
THE LAW OF THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY: PROCEEDINGS OF AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM OF THE
KIEL-WALTER SCHUCKING (Rainer Hofmann & Nils Geissler eds., 1999).
8

9

Richard Price, Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics, 55 WORLD POL. 579, 580 (2003)
(citing THE THIRD FORCE: THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY (Ann Florini ed., 1999));
David Zarnett, Transnationalized Domestic Contention: Explaining the Varying Levels of Western Solidarity
Given to Kurds and Palestinians, in CONTENTIOUS POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST POPULAR
RESISTANCE AND MARGINALIZED ACTIVISM BEYOND THE ARAB UPRISINGS 200 (Fawaz A. Gerges
ed., 2016).
See generally RACHEL COOPER, WHAT IS CIVIL SOCIETY, ITS ROLE AND VALUE IN 2018? (2018).

10

This classical definition of international law is attributed to Jeremy Bentham. See JEREMY BENTHAM,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 296 (Burns & Hart eds.,
1970). On the state-centric conception of international law, see, e.g., Jan Klabbers, (I Can’t Get No)
Recognition: Subjects Doctrine and the Emergence of Non-State Actors, in NORDIC COSMOPOLITANISM:
ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI 351, 354–57 (Jarna Petman & Jan
Klabbers eds., 2003); BARBARA K. WOODWARD, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAWMAKING AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 2 (2010); NON-STATE ACTOR DYNAMICS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM LAW-TAKERS TO LAW-MAKERS (Math Noortmann & Cedric Ryngaert
eds., 2010).

11

See, e.g., ERIC POSNER & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 (2005)
(“International law . . . is just the working out of relations among states, as they deal with relatively
discrete problems of international cooperation.”); Brad Roth, Legitimacy in the International Order: The
Continuing Relevance of Sovereign States, 11 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 60, 61 (2021)
(“Whatever may be said for ‘global civil society,’ the international order remains primarily an interstate order—a system of coordination among the governmental apparatuses that authoritatively
coordinate activity within territorially-bounded political communities.”).

12

GINSBURG, supra note 3, at 237 (citing Alistair Iain Johnston, China in a World of Orders: Rethinking
Compliance and Challenge in Beijing’s International Relations, 44 INT’L SEC. 9, 9 (2019)).
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not) with other heads of state or the production of public goods. 13 Meanwhile,
representatives of social movements, NGOs, and even international organizations
are relegated to a subordinate role as actors capable of providing some
“preservative democracy support” in a world dominated by authoritarian elites.14
This conception of the international system as one where states—and more
specifically, the leaders of states—are the main drivers and determinants of
international norms has implications for how one expects international law to
evolve. Indeed, seen in this context, Ginsburg’s conclusion that international law
will be prone to absorb the values preferred by authoritarian leaders, who are
undoubtedly growing in number and influence, is logical and not too surprising.
Yet this conception excludes at least one important set of players in the
international arena: TCS actors, whose main project and raison d’être is precisely
to influence the conduct and outcome of international affairs.15
The question of who forms part of the international community—or, more
precisely, whose voice matters in this community—is fundamental to the examination
of what is likely to happen to international law should authoritarian regimes
succeed in entrenching themselves and gaining global influence. Notwithstanding
the continued relevance of states as sites of collective decision-making and
action,16 gone are the days when states were the only relevant and unchallenged
actors on the international plane.17 With the adoption of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR) by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948 and widespread
ratification of subsequent human rights treaties, international law became much
more than just regulating interstate relations. The UDHR made it clear that the
13

14

15

16
17

Id. at 52–53 (“Democracies select leaders with relatively short personal time horizons but who are
incentivized to act for the long-term health of the country; autocracies select leaders for whom the
personal and national time horizons are the same.”).
It is only in the Conclusion to his book that Ginsburg makes a reference to the potential role of
nonstate actors in defending liberal values. GINSBURG, supra note 3, at 291–92 (“There is also the
significant work done by nonstate actors to advance and defend liberal causes. Corporations are
increasingly acting as ‘keepers’ of international law, using decisions about purchasing, investing and
employment to affect states’ calculus of how to behave.”).
See, e.g., Math Noortmann, Non-Governmental Organisations: Recognition, Roles, Rights and Responsibilities,
in NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Math Noortmann, August Reinisch & Cedric
Ryngaert eds., 2015); Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, 100 AM.
J. INT’L. L. 348 (2006); Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International
Governance 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 183–286 (1997); INGRID ROSSI, LEGAL STATUS OF
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 10–24 (2010); Robert
McCorquodale, The Individual and the International Legal System, in INTERNATIONAL LAW (Malcolm D.
Evans ed., 2d ed. 2006).
See, e.g., Roth, supra note 11.
See generally ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 46–52
(2007); CIVIL SOCIETY AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS (David Armstrong & Valeria Bello eds.,
2011).
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individual and “all organs of society”18 were subjects of and participants in the
international system in their own right.19 Certainly, states continue to play a crucial
role in implementing and protecting international human rights through their
domestic systems. Yet the ability of individuals and groups to assert their rights
under international law is normatively and legally independent of states’
recognition and enforcement of those rights. The UDHR’s revolutionary
recognition of individual rights, including the right to form associations and
participate in politics,20 created the conditions for the flourishing of TCS. Not only
did these rights—and the legal instruments in which they were enshrined—
legitimize and protect civil society organizations’ claims to exert public influence
within and across borders, but international organizations also began to open up
mechanisms for civil society to participate in the elaboration, conduct, and
enforcement of international law.21
In his review of TCS literature of the 1990s and early 2000s, Richard Price
summarized the “large menu of what [TCS] activists do and how do they do it,”
with modes of influence ranging from agenda setting (“identifying a problem of
international concern and producing information”), to developing solutions
(“creating norms or recommending policy change”), to building networks and
coalitions of allies, and implementing solutions (“employing tactics of persuasion
and pressure to change practices and/or encourage compliance with norms”).22
The TCS literature from this era sheds light on the tangible impact that
transnational networks can have in shaping outcomes domestically and
transnationally.23 Importantly, this impact can be actualized via state actors or in
spite of them. That is, TCS organizations often achieve their objectives by acting
18

19

20
21

22

23

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at
71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
See Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 44 (1996) (“We
have seen a revolution in the content of international law to include a growing field directly relevant
to the lives of five billion people, every one of them now a ‘subject’ of international law.”). See also
Manfred Nowak & Karolina Miriam Januszewski, Non-State Actors and Human Rights, in NON-STATE
ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Math Noortmann, August Reinisch & Cedric Ryngaert eds.,
2015); Andrea Bianchi, Globalization of Human Rights: The Role of Non-state Actors, in GLOBAL LAW
WITHOUT A STATE (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
UDHR, supra note 18, arts. 20, 21.
See, e.g., Dianne Otto, Non-Governmental Organizations in the United Nations System: The Emerging Role of
International Civil Society, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 107, 110 (1996); Boyle & Chinkin, supra note 17.
Price, supra note 8, at 583–84. For a recent example of civil society’s role in international law-making,
see Tom Ginsburg, Democracies and International Law: An Update, 23 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 22 (2022)
(commenting on the recent U.N. resolution inviting the participation of NGOs, CSOs, academia,
and the private sector in ad hoc committee of experts for drawing up a convention on cybercrime).
See ANN M. FLORINI, Lessons Learned, in THE THIRD FORCE: THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL
SOCIETY 211, 211 (1999) (observing the effectiveness of cross-border networks in terms of “getting
otherwise-neglected issues onto the agendas of national governments, inter-governmental
organizations, and, increasingly, corporations”).

Summer 2022

149

Chicago Journal of International Law

on state entities and influencing those entities’ behavior24—but TCS organizations
do not need states to engage in international norm generation and diffusion. More
often than not, states accompany or follow, rather than lead, civil society towards
a change in international policies and laws.25
Moreover, TCS often directly engages with actors other than governments in
its efforts to influence international policy.26 Transnational corporations, whose
24

See e.g., Frederik Galtung, A Global Network to Curb Corruption: The Experience of Transparency
International, in THE THIRD FORCE: THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY 17, 17–18 (Ann
Florini ed., 1999) (recounting the role of “Poder Ciudadano,” a local chapter of Transparency
International, in monitoring the implementation of infrastructure projects to root out corruption);
Chetan Kumar, Transnational Networks and Campaigns for Democracy, in THE THIRD FORCE: THE RISE
OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY 115, 128–35 (Ann Florini ed., 1999) (recounting the impact of
transnational civil society on US policy toward Haiti in the 1990s); Rebecca Johnson, Advocates and
Activists: Conflicting Approaches on Nonproliferation and the Test Ban Treaty, in THE THIRD FORCE: THE
RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY 49, 50 (Ann Florini ed., 1999) (“From the 1950s onward,
the protests and advice of transnational civil society, in the shape of doctors, antinuclear activists,
women’s groups, and scientist-advocates, maintained the pressure that eventually led governments
to achieve a complete [nuclear] ban.”).

25

See generally Motoko Mekata, Building Partnerships toward a Common Goal: Experiences of the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines, in THE THIRD FORCE: THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY 143
(Ann Florini ed., 1999) Mekata recounts the success of the International Campaign to Ban
Landmines (ICBL), “an amorphous network of non-governmental organizations,” in bringing into
existence the international convention to ban anti-personnel land mines through intensive public
education, media outreach and awareness raising among key government actors and leaders of
international institutions. Mekata deftly describes how the ICBL’s campaign arose independently
of states, was fueled by awareness-raising among a wide spectrum of stakeholders (not just states)
and required the constant push of ICBL members to forge consensus on a total ban despite
attempts by states to derail or water-down the process. Id. at 143. A decade after ratification of the
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, civil society again mobilized to achieve international
prohibition (or regulation) of lethal autonomous weapons. See Megan M. Roberts & Kyle L.
Evanoff, Can Civil Society Succeed in Its Quest to Ban ‘Killer Robots’?, WORLD POL. REV. (Nov. 17, 2017),
https://perma.cc/9PCR-2JF3:
Years of sustained activism were necessary for the CCW even to commence
discussions on autonomous weapons . . . The movement picked up steam after
2012, when Human Rights Watch published a widely read report that coincided
with accelerating progress in the field of machine learning. Only after Human
Rights Watch joined 29 other nongovernmental organizations in forming the
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, an international coalition dedicated to a preemptive ban on autonomous weapons, did the CCW add autonomous weapons
to its agenda in 2014 . . . Among the dozen or so factors that researchers have
identified as contributing to the successful conclusion of arms control treaties,
only one—active civil society support—is present in the case of autonomous
weapons.
See generally Francesca Colli & Johan Adriaensen, Lobbying the State or The Market? A Framework to
Study Civil Society Organizations’ Strategic Behavior, 14 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 501–13 (2020):
the market is an increasingly attractive venue for political action as a result of
several socio-economic trends: the rise of political consumers—consumers who
are aware of the politics of products, and care about where and how their
products are made; the ease by which lead firms can be identified; and the means
to mobilize consumers through social media

26
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economic power and influence exceeds that of many states, are often (and
increasingly) the direct targets of TCS advocacy campaigns. For instance, in the
absence of effective government regulation of social media content, civil society
in the U.S. has resorted to establishing independent mechanisms to monitor and
assess platforms’ algorithms and policies surrounding political advertising, with
the aim of holding social media companies publicly accountable.27 Research
institutes and think tanks have innovated tools to monitor and record company
practices,28 while grassroots organizations and coalitions, such as Change the
Terms, Color of Change, and MediaJustice, have mobilized public opinion to
exhort companies to address hate speech and misinformation.29 More generally,
civil society organizations have developed a range of strategies to influence
powerful corporate actors directly, including engagement in shareholder activism,
cooperation in the creation of transnational private regulatory regimes, and the
provision of technical assistance in the development and implementation of best
practices.30
Given these documented influences, my question is the following: How
might Ginsburg’s predictions about the course of international law change if he
were to pay closer attention to TCS actors, networks, and movements as relevant
players and active participants in the international arena?

III. A TEST OF RESILIENCE
For more than a decade, international observers have raised alarms about
the shrinking space for civil society.31 It is an inherent feature of authoritarian
regimes that they make life onerous for civil society, as anything that lies outside
of the control of the state is seen as a threat to the regime’s survival. Therefore,
the proliferation and intensification of authoritarianism around the world is likely
Julia Anaf, Fran Baum, Matthew Fisher & Sharon Friel, Civil Society Action Against Transnational
Corporations: Implications for Health Promotion, 35 HEALTH PROMOTION INT’L. 877–87 (Aug. 1, 2020).
27

28

29

30

31

See Digital Democracy Initiative: Platform Accountability Document Review, DEMOCRACY FUND 8 (Apr.
2020), https://perma.cc/E999-34HE.
See, e.g., Cybersecurity for Democracy, NYU CENTER FOR CYBERSECURITY, https://perma.cc/8YQMP2NT; Ranking Digital Right, 2020 Ranking Digital Rights Corporate Accountability Index,
https://perma.cc/4Z4D-PQ85.
CHANGE
THE
TERMS,
https://perma.cc/B4ZA-3P6C;
COLOR
OF
CHANGE,
https://perma.cc/S92G-WUR4; MEDIAJUSTICE, https://perma.cc/W6FR-V4MD.
See Colli & Adriaensen, supra note 26, at 504. See also Trina Hamilton, Beyond Market Signals:
Negotiating Marketplace Politics and Corporate Responsibilities, 89 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 285 (2013).
See generally Saskia Brechenmacher, Civil Society Under Assault, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT (May 8,
2017), https://perma.cc/858S-F7A9. Sarah Repucci & Amy Slipowitz, Freedom in the World 2021,
Democracy Under Siege, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://perma.cc/6L9K-XV93 (“Incumbent leaders
increasingly used force to crush opponents and settle scores, sometimes in the name of public
health, while beleaguered activists—lacking effective international support—faced heavy jail
sentences, torture, or murder in many settings.”).
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to heighten the challenges faced by organized movements in carrying out their
activities, particularly where those activities involve calling for greater government
accountability and transparency.
Taking a simplistic view, there are two alternative scenarios for civil society
in a world where authoritarian regimes become the dominant form of government
and source of international influence. In one scenario, autocracies succeed in
stamping civil society nearly or entirely out of existence; in the other, civil society
actors and social movements become emboldened by the growing threat to their
existence, develop new forms of resistance, and successfully push forth a
normative discourse that challenges the ascendancy of the state. The reality will
likely turn out to be somewhere between these two extremes and vary from
context to context. Nonetheless, it may be worth considering these alternative
scenarios and their implications for the entrenchment of “authoritarian
international law.”
From one perspective, civil society has gradually been losing both strength
and legitimacy and is heading toward extinction in many parts of the world. There
is no shortage of examples where this situation seems to be taking hold. In the
past year alone, assaults on civil society have rapidly escalated in Hong Kong, 32

32

In 2020, China’s imposition of the National Security Law for Hong Kong allowed the police
wide-ranging powers to restrict the exercise of basic civil and political rights, including public
assembly and freedom of speech. The advent of the law has seen numerous arrests of
pro-democracy activists, and over fifty civil society organizations including unions, churches, media,
private business, and political parties have had their assets frozen or been forced to disband.
Intimidation campaigns continue to force civil society groups unfavorable to the government to
consider disbanding. Lynn Hu, How Hong Kong Lost Its Once Treasured Civil Liberties, STUDENTS FOR
LIBERTY (Jan. 4, 2022), https://perma.cc/6AGV-Q6RK; National Security, H.K. FREE PRESS,
https://perma.cc/4JVU-ZTG5; The Shadowy Messengers Delivering Threats to Hong Kong Civil Society,
FRANCE 24 (last updated Feb. 21, 2022), https://perma.cc/3LAQ-MW6W. For the English text of
the national security law, see In Full: Official English Translation of the Hong Kong National Security Law,
H.K. FREE PRESS, https://perma.cc/J359-X37Q.
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Myanmar,33 Sri Lanka,34 Belarus,35 Hungary,36 and Ethiopia37—to name just a few
countries. According to Freedom House, in 2021, the countries experiencing
deterioration in access to political rights and civil liberties outnumbered those with
improvements by the largest recorded margin since Freedom House reported a decline
in global freedoms beginning in 2006.38 In apparent synchrony, governments
around the world have ramped up their use of surveillance, intimidation, arbitrary
detentions, illegal house arrests, torture, and prosecutions against activists and
human rights defenders—all under the guise of combatting terrorism, protecting
public health, preventing misinformation, and preserving national sovereignty.39
In many cases, civil society actors have responded to such threats by scaling back
their advocacy, reorienting their work toward less politically sensitive activities

38

Freedom in the World 2022: Myanmar, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://perma.cc/N4ZQ-PX6D
(“Myanmar’s already-stalled democratic transition was completely derailed in February 2021, when
the military, known as the Tatmadaw, seized control of the government, arresting dozens of senior
government officials and preventing the newly elected parliament from convening.”).
Sri Lanka 2021, AMNESTY INT’L, https://perma.cc/4HHY-TSJE:
In April in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the police announced that
they would take legal action against those who publish posts on social media
criticizing government officials and obstructing their duties. Several social media
commentators were arrested following the announcement . . . Thousands of
people were arrested for violating the COVID-19 curfew, despite it having no
legal basis. Police also used excessive force to arrest activists peacefully carrying
out a Black Lives Matter solidarity protest in strict observance of COVID-19
guidelines, without first giving the protesters the opportunity to disperse
voluntarily.
Freedom in the World 2021: Belarus, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://perma.cc/WT8A-FNXE (“After
permitting limited displays of dissent as part of a drive to pursue better relations with the European
Union (EU) and the United States, the government in 2020 cracked down on a massive
antigovernment protest movement, sparked by a fraudulent presidential election, and severely
limited fundamental civil liberties.”).
In Hungary, the conferral of sweeping powers on the executive during the COVID-19 pandemic
has allowed the administration to promulgate and apply draconian laws restricting public assembly
against civil society groups unfavorable to the government, crippling them with steep fines even
when they comply with said laws. On March 30, the governing parties’ two-thirds parliamentary
majority passed the Authorization Act, significantly expanding the scope of potential decrees the
government could adopt in the event of a “state of danger.” Hungary: Events of 2020, HUM. RTS.
WATCH, https://perma.cc/WN5H-Z6G7:
While the Authorization Act was revoked in mid-June, Parliament
simultaneously adopted a new law enabling the government to declare future
public health or medical emergencies during which it could order any and all
measures it deems necessary without parliamentary approval, including
suspending laws and curtailing fundamental rights such as freedom of
movement and assembly for six months.
2021 Countries & Regions, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://perma.cc/5FCP-R4BZ (“The initially
reformist government responded to political and ethnic unrest with mass arrests and a military
offensive in the Tigray Region, leading to widespread and egregious human rights violations.”).
Id.

39

See id.

33

34

35

36

37
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such as service delivery, or ending their operations altogether.40 Such trends could
intensify and metastasize to other parts of the world, leading to an accelerating
erosion of cross-border social movements and transnational advocacy networks
in decades to come. Thus, the conjunction of repressive governments seizing and
entrenching their power could well result in a definite shift in global relations and
norms.
From another perspective, however, the intensification of authoritarianism
has spurred—and could continue to spur—the revitalization and reinvention of
civil society spaces. For instance, while authoritarian regimes have seized
opportunities to suppress the exercise of civil liberties during the COVID-19
pandemic, activists have innovated ways of assembling, calling attention to their
causes, and strengthening their networks.41 Across Southeast Asia, North Africa,
and the Middle East, civil society organizations have joined forces with opposition
parties and local governments to provide emergency relief to communities in
need, thereby strengthening their grassroots networks and enhancing their
legitimacy.42 In Turkey, students made use of trendy “hashtag campaigns” to raise
awareness and protest the government’s pandemic restrictions affecting their
education.43 In Poland, at the height of the pandemic, protestors effectuated a
nonviolent civil disruption by parking their cars and blocking traffic on Warsaw’s
main roads.44 Notably, certain methods and tactics have spread from one country
to the next—residents of Brazil banged their pots and pans from their balconies
to protest President Jair Bolsonaro’s mishandling of the pandemic,45 while citizens
in Myanmar did the same every night after February 1, 2021 to protest the military
coup.46 In all of these cases, despite lockdowns and closures of physical public
spaces, civil society has been creative in devising impactful means of expressing
grievances and mobilizing communities.

40

Brechenmacher, supra note 31, at 2–3.

41

Jasmin Lorch, Monika Onken & Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, Sustaining Civic Space in Times of COVID-19:
Global Trends, GERMAN INST. GLOB. AREA STUD. (Nov. 8, 2021), https://perma.cc/QL7G-XEVL.
See id.; Nicola Nixon, Civil Society in Southeast Asia during COVID-19: Responding and Evolving under
Pressure, ASIA FOUND. (Sep. 2020), https://perma.cc/FEZ6-WYCT. See also, Vijayan MJ, Dark
Clouds and Silver Linings: Authoritarianism and Civic Action in India, in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE
SHADOW OF THE CORONAVIRUS, 17–20 (Richard Youngs ed., 2020), https://perma.cc/9MPAMBAL; Youssef Cherif, Hafsa Halawa & Özge Zihnioğlu, The Coronavirus and Civic Activism in the
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Civil society is also highly adaptable. In the face of government-imposed
firewalls and internet outages, activists have developed savvy digital techniques
and new platforms to evade censorship and disseminate information.47 Advocacy
networks have also mobilized monetary resources at critical moments48 while
embracing new technologies, such as cryptocurrencies, to secure funding and
bypass the banking systems controlled by corrupt dictators.49 In short, even in the
most hostile environments, civil society has proven to be resilient by innovating
tactics to evade repression and finding creative outlets to express resistance.
Few countries’ citizens have endured as much unbridled brutality at the
hands of their government as Myanmar, the country where I lived and worked
from 2013 to 2016. Since its violent seizure of power on February 1, 2021, the
State Administration Council (or junta) has actively persecuted members of civil
society through intensified surveillance, raids, and arrests. As of February 1, 2022,
the military has killed over 1,500 people, including children, and arbitrarily
47
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detained 11,800 political leaders, activists, and union leaders.50 Dozens of civil
society organizations have had to close offices and send members into hiding or
exile.51 Fear and mistrust have made coordination and communication across
organizations difficult; banking constraints and intense humanitarian pressures
have forced many organizations to reduce their operations or redirect them
toward issues that are less politically risky.52
But the military coup has had another unintended effect on civil society in
Myanmar: it has galvanized portions of the population that had previously been
politically inactive to join the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM)—a mass
movement led by women and youth, supported by essential workers, civil
servants, and consumers—which is boycotting military-produced goods and
services. Through acts of civil resistance, including labor strikes and road
blockades, CDM has served as a crucial vector for mobilization on the streets and
online. In its more than two years of mobilization, the movement has put a strain
on the armed forces by attracting the allegiance of over 8,000 soldiers and law
enforcement officers.53 Equally important, the enduring and peaceful resistance of
CDM activists on the ground has lent domestic and international legitimacy to the
parallel civil National Unity Government (NUG) with which it is aligned.54
The NUG, which garnered the support of a broad coalition of ousted
parliamentarians, civil society leaders, and ethnic armed organizations, has made
timely use of virtual platforms to hold internal cabinet meetings, meet with
high-level foreign officials, and even participate in official intergovernmental
forums, all the while evading the military’s detection and crackdowns.55 During
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the COVID-19 pandemic, the NUG has deployed creative uses of edtech and
telehealth initiatives to provide direct services to the public, thereby filling the
vacuum in governmental functions left by the junta.56 Echoing demands by CDM
and the NUG, civil society groups and trade unions around the world have
published statements calling for governments to officially recognize the shadow
civilian government, intensify targeted economic sanctions, enact a global arms
embargo against the junta and establish a military no-fly zone over the country.57
While not all of these demands have materialized, without the ongoing pressure
and mobilization of Myanmar diaspora and grassroots movements, it is difficult
to imagine the U.N. General Assembly passing its proposed resolution calling for
Member States to prevent the flow of arms into Myanmar,58 the U.N. Security
Council affirming its “support for the people of Myanmar and the country’s
democratic transition,”59 or the E.U. Parliament extending recognition to the
NUG as the legitimate representative of the people.60

IV. PROACTIVE REVITALIZATION
None of the above is meant to suggest that transnational advocacy is
inherently pro-democratic and pro-liberal. Just like international law,61
transnational networks are tools that can be used for liberal or illiberal ends. As
Anne Applebaum has observed, in recent decades, authoritarian leaders have built
robust cross-border networks of their own, “composed of kleptocratic financial
structures, security services (military, police, paramilitary groups, surveillance), and
professional propagandists.”62 The material resources that pro-democratic
transnational networks mobilize to support liberal media and civil society pales in
comparison to the money that autocrats have invested in troll farms and bots to
ramp up their media campaigns,63 in security technologies to enhance their
surveillance, and in projects that use subtle forms of influence and co-optation to
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undermine the very foundations and normative appeal of human rights.64
Moreover, there are genuine transnational networks that seek to promote
anti-liberal aims. Among the most influential contemporary networks are those
driven by far-right ethnonationalist thinkers promoting nativist and reactionary
social policies and disseminating Islamophobic and generally anti-immigrant
attitudes.65 Indeed, the work of sociologist Dylan Riley on the “civic foundations”
of interwar fascism confirms that civil society organizations can be a basis for
profoundly anti-liberal movements and policies.66
Given these formidable countervailing forces, there is much that
transnational networks seeking to defend human rights need to do to revamp their
support for democratic movements. Western development partners need to look
beyond traditional civil society organizations and start directly supporting budding
and more informal sectors of civil society, as those are often the ones that remain
at the front lines when the well-established civil society organization structures
begin to founder. Western development partners should continue exploring fast
and secure ways to disburse funding to actors fighting on the ground, minimize
bureaucratic requirements, innovate safe and fast communication channels, and
allow civil society organizations the financial flexibility requested by them, bearing
in mind the volatile and risky environment in which they are working.67 Business
actors, too, can leverage their creativity and enormous economic power to protect
and promote democracy.68 So far, autocratic regimes have been successful at
bending multinational corporations to their will, using Facebook to crack down
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on human rights defenders in Vietnam,69 and compelling Apple and Google to
remove pro-democracy tools from their services in Russia.70
The human rights community needs to push back more fiercely and
creatively than it currently does. It needs to devise new, effective ways to enforce
human rights against corporations and their supply chains to ensure that their
complicity with autocratic leaders does not go unnoticed and unpunished. It needs
to harness the power of information technology more effectively, developing ways
to bypass censorship and internet outages while countering authoritarian rhetoric
with more effective messaging of liberal values. It needs to create nimble human
rights mechanisms to complement the traditional bodies housed in the U.N.—
which are often sluggish, conservative, and politically compromised—and it needs
to leverage a larger cross-section of society to finance, sustain, and imbue
normative vigor to the pro-democracy and human rights project. In short, prodemocracy TCS and governments need to enhance their coordination, revamp
their transnational strategies, and modernize their toolboxes.

V. CONCLUSION
If the next era of territorial government is indeed tipped toward
authoritarianism, there will be an even greater demand for civil society to provide
alternative spaces for political discourse, norm generation, and action. Civil society
already garners its legitimacy from its claim to represent and speak for the interests
of ordinary individuals. This claim to legitimacy could become more pronounced
in an era of authoritarian-dominated international law, to the point of challenging
the state-centered international order. To be clear, I am not suggesting that states
will disappear. The extent to which nation-states retain military and institutional
power is undeniable. What I am saying is that civil society has a role to play, not
only in the conduct and outcome of international relations, but in the creation of
structures of power and meaning. This influence should not be discounted.
As I write this Essay, Putin has launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Tanks rolling into Kyiv and rockets destroying buildings in Kharkiv are somber
reminders of the brute coercive power that states continue to wield. But at the
same time, millions of people are rallying in Ukraine and around the world in
support of democracy. Anti-war protests and acts of civil defiance are occurring
on a massive scale across Russia in one of the largest popular challenges to Putin
to date.71 And, with their extraordinary mobilization, Ukrainian civilians
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themselves have so far managed to stop a Russian takeover of their main cities.
While a flood of economic and diplomatic sanctions from Western governments
may raise the cost of Putin’s invasion, it is the pressure from grassroots civil
society, business leaders, and transnational advocacy networks that will to a large
extent determine Ukraine’s fate—and that of the international order at large.
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